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ABSTRACT  
The ubiquity of cell phones in today’s society has forced 
courts to change or dismiss established, but inapplicable 
analytical frameworks. Two such frameworks in the school setting 
are regulations of student speech and of student searches. This 
Article traces the constitutional jurisprudence of both First 
Amendment off-campus speech protection and Fourth Amendment 
search standards as applied to the school setting. It then analyzes 
how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley v. California complicates 
both areas. Finally, it proposes a pragmatic solution: by 
recognizing a categorical First Amendment exception for 
“substantial threats” against the school community, courts could 
accommodate students’ constitutional rights while upholding 
school administrators’ ability to maintain a safe environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Cell phone technology has changed almost every aspect of the 
modern age. Cell phones provide a means to access and store vast amounts 
of information and to communicate with people around the world. They 
are also popular across age groups, including among children and teens 
who use them as a primary mode of communication and entertainment. 
Because cell phone users keep their phones on their person, this poses 
several problems in the school setting, where traditionally school 
administrators can regulate certain student speech and conduct some 
searches of student belongings. Courts have failed to adopt a consistent 
standard for school administrators’ scope of authority over off-campus 
speech. Although the Supreme Court has developed a test for assessing the 
reasonableness of a search in school, it has not clarified how cell phones 
fit within that test. This Article traces the constitutional contours both of 
student speech and student searches, identifies the nuanced issues posed 
by cell phones, and proposes a solution that honors the underlying 
concerns on all sides: abolish the inconsistent standards of authority for 
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off-campus speech and recognize a narrowly defined First Amendment 
exception for “substantial threats” to the school community. 
I. OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Supreme Court’s Student Speech Cases 
The Supreme Court first addressed student free speech rights 
within public schools in the seminal case, Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District. 1  In Tinker, school officials 
suspended three students from school when the students refused to remove 
their black armbands, which they wore in protest of the Vietnam War.2 
Afterwards, the students sued, claiming the school had violated their First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech.3 The case reached the Supreme 
Court, which found in favor of the students and their right to protest. It 
held that, although school officials may control conduct in the schools, any 
regulation must be consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards 
and be motivated “by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”4 Indeed, the court proclaimed, “[i]t can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”5 
Despite the favorable ruling, the Court ultimately curtailed 
students’ speech rights in other contexts. In weighing the competing 
interests, the Court ruled that a school may interfere with a student’s 
speech if the school can show that the speech would “materially and 
substantially interfere[] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in 
the operation of the school”6 or would “involve substantial disorder . . . of 
the rights of others.” 7  This “substantial disruption” test established a 
strong precedent for on campus student speech rights that still applies 
today.  
The Court has since altered the scope of Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” standard, allowing school administrators to regulate speech 
                                                 
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
2 Id. at 504. 
3 Id. at 504-05. 
4 Id. at 509. 
5 Id. at 506. 
6 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) 
7 Id. 
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when (1) the speech is vulgar,8 (2) the speech is disseminated through 
school resources,9 or (3) the speech promotes illegal drug use.10 
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court upheld a 
student’s suspension for “lewd and indecent” speech. 11  A school 
suspended Matthew Fraser, a high school senior, for delivering a speech 
at an assembly that included an “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphor.”12 The Court distinguished Fraser’s vulgar and lewd speech 
from Tinker’s political speech because the former “undermined the 
school’s basic educational mission,”13 which includes instilling in students 
the “habits and manners of civility” necessary to be productive citizens.14 
Thus, Fraser established an exception to Tinker’s “substantial disruption 
or material interference” test, granting schools deference to regulate lewd 
and indecent speech occurring at school.15 
 Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 
Court held that a school may exercise greater editorial control of a school-
sponsored newspaper to ensure that it presents students with material 
suitable for their maturity level.16 In Kuhlmeier, a high school principal 
removed two student articles from the school newspaper, one discussing 
teenage pregnancy and the other dealing with divorce.17 Three students 
sued, claiming the principal’s censorship violated their First Amendment 
rights.18 In its analysis, the Court rejected the idea that a school-sponsored 
newspaper was a public forum. 19  It then distinguished the issue from 
Tinker, framing the question as whether the First Amendment required a 
school to promote, rather than merely tolerate, particular student speech.20 
The Court answered its inquiry in the negative, focusing on the school’s 
right to editorial control over its official newspaper.21 In doing so, the 
Court did not apply either of the Tinker prongs in its analysis.22 
                                                 
8 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
9 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988). 
10 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402 (2007). 
11 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
12 Id. at 678. 
13 Id. at 685. 
14 Id. at 681. 
15 Id. at 685. 
16 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271. 
17 Id. at 263. 
18 Id. at 264. 
19 Id. at 269. 
20 Id. at 270–71. 
21 Id. at 273. 
22 Id. at 272–73.  
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 The Court most recently altered the scope of Tinker in Morse v. 
Frederick, expanding school administrators’ authority to regulate speech 
occurring off-campus. 23  In Morse, a school suspended a student for 
displaying a banner on a school field trip that his principal believed was 
advocating illegal drug use.24 The Court upheld the suspension, finding 
that a school’s choice to censor drug-related speech did not constitute an 
abstract desire to avoid controversy.25 The Court’s ruling thus created a 
second categorical exception to Tinker’s protection: “promoting illegal 
drug use.”26 Notably, in its holding, the Court expanded the geographic 
scope of school administrators’ authority beyond the physical schoolhouse 
gate itself, concluding that the circumstances of the field trip amounted to 
the student being at school.27 
 These four cases comprise the core of student speech First 
Amendment doctrine. Tinker first established the broad protection to 
students with the “substantial disruption and material interference” test.28 
The Court has created two content-based exceptions to Tinker’s 
protection—vulgar speech and speech advocating drug use—where 
schools have far greater regulatory authority. Furthermore, the Court has 
expanded a school’s authority regarding school-sponsored expression and 
to off-campus school-related events.  
B. The Circuit Courts Apply Tinker in the Modern Age 
In the modern age, the ubiquitous use of social media coupled with 
the popularity of cell phones has spawned a growing and inconsistent body 
of law regarding First Amendment protection of off-campus student 
speech. The Supreme Court has yet to affirm that Tinker is applicable to 
speech originating outside the school setting, and if so, to what extent. 
Consequently, the lower courts have sought to define the circumstances in 
which schools may regulate off-campus student speech. Although the 
specific language differs amongst the circuits, the resulting tests for 
whether schools may regulate off-campus speech fall in two categories: 
proximity thresholds and safety thresholds. 
 
                                                 
23 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007). 
24 Id. at 401. 
25 Id. at 408–409. 
26 Id. at 400. 
27 Id. at 400–01. The Court considered the student to be at school because he was 
at an event that occurred during school hours with teachers in attendance, that 
included a performance by the school’s band and cheerleaders, and where he was 
visible to fellow classmates. Id. 
28 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
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1. Proximity Thresholds 
Proximity thresholds seek to qualify the relationship between the 
speech in question and the school. When speech occurs at school, Tinker 
governs. The further removed the speech is from the school, the more 
difficult it is to justify the speech as falling under the school’s scope of 
authority. Several circuit courts have articulated specific analytical 
frameworks for assessing the scope of schools’ authority based on the 
speech’s proximity to the school grounds, school community, or school 
officials. 
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School 
District, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals extended a school’s 
regulatory authority to student speech occurring off-campus and outside 
the school setting.29 In Wisniewski, an eighth-grade student appealed his 
suspension for sharing with friends via AOL Instant Messaging from his 
home computer an animated icon suggesting that his teacher should be 
shot and killed.30 A concerned classmate informed the targeted teacher, 
who shared the image with the school administration, the student’s 
parents, and the local police. 31 The student acknowledged that he had 
created the image and expressed remorse, but was nevertheless suspended 
for five days. 32  In response, the student’s parents brought forth an 
unsuccessful suit in the district court.33 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
concluded first that the student’s actions “pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable 
risk that the icon would come to the attention of school authorities.”34 Only 
then did it apply Tinker, concluding that the icon would “materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”35 
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its “reasonable foreseeability” 
rationale the following year in Doninger v. Niehoff.36 The court upheld 
disciplinary action against a student who posted on her personal blog a 
derogatory and false message that encouraged readers to contact school 
administrators to express dismay over the administrators’ negative 
handling of a student event.37 Citing Wisniewski, the court determined that 
not only was it reasonably foreseeable that the student’s post would reach 
                                                 
29 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
30 Id. at 35–36. 
31 Id. at 36. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 37. 
34 Id. at 38. 
35 Id. at 39. 
36 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
37 Id. at 43–44.  
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school property, but it “was purposely designed . . . to come onto the 
campus” and “to encourage her fellow students to read and respond.”38 
The court next applied Tinker, finding that the post’s harsh language,39 the 
misleading nature of the post, 40  and that the student was a student 
government leader all contributed to the likelihood that the post would 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.”41 
The Fourth Circuit cited Doninger in a 2011 decision in which it 
upheld Kara Kowalski’s suspension for creating a MySpace page 
dedicated to bullying and shaming a classmate. 42 Kowalski created the 
group and invited roughly 100 classmates on her MySpace “friends” list.43 
Upon discovering the group, the targeted student filed a harassment 
complaint, prompting school administrators to suspend Kowalski for 
violation of the policy against harassment, bullying, and intimidation.44 
The Fourth Circuit heard Kowalski’s case on appeal to determine whether 
her activity fell within the boundaries of the high school’s “legitimate 
interest in maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being 
and educational rights of its students.”45 While acknowledging the holding 
in Doninger, the court used its own analysis: 
There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the 
order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue 
originates outside the schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully define 
that limit here, as we are satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech 
to [the school’s] pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to 
justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out their role 
as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.46 
The court failed to list or set out the factors necessary to show the 
sufficiency of a “nexus” between speech and a school’s interests. 47 
Furthermore, despite discussing the Second Circuit’s “reasonable 
foreseeability” rationale, the Fourth Circuit did not explain if or how the 
“nexus” test differed from the “reasonable foreseeability” test, leading 
                                                 
38 Id. at 50. 
39 Id. at 50–51.  
40 Id. at 51. 
41 Id. at 52. 
42 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 568–69.  
45 Id. at 571. 
46 Id. at 573. 
47 Id. 
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some scholars to conclude that the Fourth Circuit adopted the Second 
Circuit’s test using different language.48  
 In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit 
developed a variation on the “reasonable foreseeability” test that allowed 
it to reach a conclusion without deciding whether Tinker applied to off-
campus speech.49 In J.S., the Third Circuit found that a school district had 
violated a student’s First Amendment rights when it suspended the student 
for creating a fake MySpace profile for the school’s principal.50 The court 
concluded that “the profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken 
it seriously . . . .  Thus, it was clearly not reasonably foreseeable that [the] 
speech would create a substantial disruption or material interference in 
school.” 51  Unlike the Second Circuit’s test, which first looks to the 
reasonable foreseeability of the speech reaching the school before 
applying Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test,52 the Third Circuit looked 
instead to the foreseeability of the substantial disruption itself. Because the 
student’s act failed this threshold, the court ended its analysis, 
“assum[ing], without deciding, that Tinker applie[d] to [the] speech in this 
case.”53  
 In S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District, the Eighth Circuit 
ruled in favor of a school district’s 180-day suspension of two brothers for 
a disruption caused by their personal website.54 The students had moved 
for a Preliminary Injunction to lift their suspension,55 but the Eight Circuit 
reversed the injunction, finding that the students were unlikely to succeed 
on the merits.56 The students’ website included a blog that “contained a 
variety of offensive and racist comments as well as sexually explicit and 
degrading comments about female classmates, whom they identified by 
                                                 
48 Watt Lesley Black, Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the Schoolhouse Gate: 
Interpreting Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 531, 551 (2015) (“A 
fairly stable consensus has emerged in the case law that Tinker can appropriately 
be applied to off-campus student speech . . . . The Second, Fourth, and Eighth 
Circuits all considered the question of the reasonable foreseeability that a 
student’s off-campus speech would reach the school before extending Tinker to 
off-campus speech.”).  
49 J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 930 (emphasis added). 
52 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
53 J.S., 650 F.3d at 926. 
54 S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th 
Cir. 2012). 
55 Id. at 773. 
56 Id. at 776. 
 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 8 
 
 
name.”57 The court looked to Doninger, Kowalski, and J.S. to determine 
the scope of the school’s authority.58 Similar to Kowalski and Doninger, 
the blog posts here “could reasonably be expected to reach the school or 
impact the environment.” 59  Unlike J.S., the speech here “caused 
considerable disturbance and disruption.”60 Therefore, the court applied 
Tinker.61 
 Except for the Fourth Circuit, the proximity thresholds use 
“reasonable foreseeability” tests to examine the proximity between the 
speech in question and the school environment. Although these circuits all 
use the “reasonable foreseeability” language in their pre-Tinker analysis, 
they ask slightly different questions regarding what is reasonably 
foreseeable. The various circuits ask whether it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the speech “will come to the attention of school authorities,”62 “will 
reach school property,”63 will create “a substantial disruption,”64 or will “ 
reach the school or impact the environment.” 65  These differences, 
although minimal, have produced inconsistent tests across the circuits. 
2. Safety Thresholds 
Other circuits have instituted higher threshold requirements that 
limit schools’ scope of authority more than the “reasonable foreseeability” 
test does. These circuits look not only to the foreseeability that the speech 
will reach the school in some form, but also to the content of the speech 
itself. As digital speech becomes more common, mere foreseeability that 
speech will reach school becomes inevitable. These courts look to the 
threatening nature of the speech and the likelihood that the speech will 
encroach upon other student’s rights of safety and security at school. 
In Wynar v. Douglas County School District,66 the Ninth Circuit 
held that school administrators had the authority to discipline a student 
who sent “a string of increasingly violent and threatening instant messages 
                                                 
57 Id. at 773. 
58 Id. at 777–78.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 778. 
61 Id. 
62 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d. 
Cir. 2007).  
63 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
64 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 
2011) 
65 S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th 
Cir. 2012). 
66 Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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. . . bragging about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates, 
[and] intimating that he would ‘take out’ other people at a school shooting 
on a specific date.” 67  In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 
decisions of its sister circuits to clarify the various threshold tests.68 In the 
Ninth Circuit’s view, Doninger, Kowalski, and S.J.W. had established 
different thresholds as prerequisites to applying Tinker,69 while the Third 
Circuit and, in a  case not involving digital speech, the Fifth Circuit, had 
“left open the question whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech.”70 
After its review of the current landscape, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to adopt any of the other circuits’ reasoning, noting its hesitation 
to create a “one-size fits all approach.”71 Instead, the court grounded its 
reasoning in the threatening content of the student’s speech, holding that 
“when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may 
take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the 
requirements of Tinker.”72 The Ninth Circuit deviated further from other 
circuits by analyzing the threatening speech under the “invasion of the 
rights of others” prong of Tinker. 73  Although the court declined to 
elaborate on the exact scope of these rights, it concluded that the threats of 
a school shooting “represent the quintessential harm to the rights of other 
students to be secure.”74 
The Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Bell v. Itawamba County 
School Board upheld a school board’s authority to discipline a student for 
recording a threatening rap song outside of school and posting it on his 
                                                 
67 Id. at 1065–66. 
68 Id. at 1068. 
69 Id. at 1068–69 (“The Fourth Circuit requires that the speech have a sufficient 
‘nexus’ to the school, while the Eighth Circuit requires that it be ‘reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community.’ The Second Circuit 
has not decided ‘whether it must be shown that it was reasonably foreseeable that 
[the speech] would reach the school property or whether the undisputed fact that 
it did reach the school pretermits any inquiry as to this aspect of reasonable 
foreseeability.’ But at least where it is reasonably foreseeable that off-campus 
speech meeting the Tinker test will wind up at school, the Second Circuit has 
permitted schools to impose discipline based on the speech.”). 
70  Id. at 1069. (“The Third Circuit “assumed, without deciding, that Tinker 
applie[d]” to a student’s creation of a parody MySpace profile mocking the school 
principal, but held that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the speech would 
create a substantial disruption.”). Id. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1071–72.  
74 Id. at 1072. 
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Facebook page.75 The song contained obscene language and accused two 
high school coaches by name of sexually harassing female students.76 The 
lyrics alluded to potential violent acts against those coaches. 77 After a 
hearing, the school board’s disciplinary committee found that the song had 
constituted “harassment [or] intimidation of []teachers, in violation of 
school policy,” and imposed several punishments.78 The case eventually 
reached the Fifth Circuit’s en banc panel, which held that the school board 
had not violated the student’s First Amendment rights.79  
In conducting its analysis, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that five 
of the six circuits to address the scope of a school’s authority had 
determined that Tinker could apply to speech that originated and was 
disseminated off-campus.80 It then expressed its hesitation, similar to the 
Ninth Circuit, to “adopt any rigid standard” regarding a school’s scope of 
authority.81 Instead, the court established a test sufficient to address the 
facts in Bell.82 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Tinker applies to a 
student’s off-campus speech when (1) “a student intentionally directs 
[speech] at the school community,”83 and (2) the speech is “reasonably 
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a 
teacher.” 84  The first prong of this test resembles the reasonable 
foreseeability test. The second prong, however, looks to the content of the 
                                                 
75 Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
76 Id. at 383–84. 
77  See id. at 384 (“At the very least, this incredibly profane and vulgar rap 
recording had at least four instances of threatening, harassing, and intimidating 
language against the two coaches: 
1. ‘betta watch your back / I'm a serve this [n****], like I serve the 
junkies with some crack’; 
2. ‘Run up on T–Bizzle / I'm going to hit you with my rueger’; 
3. ‘you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your 
mouth / Boww’; and 
4. ‘middle fingers up if you want to cap that [n****]/ middle fingers up 
/ he get no mercy [n****]’.”). 
78 Id. at 386. 
79 Id. at 399. 
80 Id. at 393–94. The majority concluded that the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits had applied Tinker in these circumstances, while the Third 
Circuit was unclear on the issue. Notably, despite the Ninth Circuit’s express 
hesitance to adopt another circuit’s test or to create its own test, the Bell majority 
interpreted its ruling in Wynar to apply Tinker. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit 
included itself in the tally, despite having not yet ruled on this exact issue.  
81 Id. at 396. 
82 Id. at 395–96.  
83 Id. at 396. 
84 Id. 
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student’s speech to determine if Tinker applies. Given the “threatening 
content” threshold, it is hard to imagine a situation in which a student’s 
speech would satisfy both prongs, but then fail under Tinker. In Bell, 
having found that the student’s song satisfied both prongs of this test, the 
court then conducted its Tinker analysis, finding that, in this case, it was 
reasonable for school officials to conclude that the song would cause a 
substantial disruption.85 Notably, the court did not define “threatening,” 
“harassing,” or “intimidating” language, which one dissenting judge 
criticized, opining that the test was unconstitutionally vague.86 
While the Ninth and Fifth Circuits deviated from the “reasonable 
foreseeability” line of cases, their respective tests naturally incorporate the 
“reasonable foreseeability” analysis, since threatening or harassing 
language directed at the school community is likely to reach its target. In 
essence, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ test imposes another, limiting 
threshold before conducting a Tinker analysis. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES IN AND OUT  
OF THE SCHOOL SETTING 
 Part I traced the current legal landscape of the scope of schools’ 
authority over off-campus speech. Although the circuit courts’ respective 
cases are modern, with Bell decided as recently as 2015, the technological 
landscape has transformed since then.87 Most notably, both the prevalence 
and capabilities of cell phones have increased in recent years, allowing the 
vast majority of students to remain plugged in to their social networks 
throughout the school day. As cell phones increase the ease of 
connectedness, the scope of schools’ authority over off-campus digital 
speech rises, since the “reasonable foreseeability” barriers become easier 
to breach. This regulatory power, however, butts up against students’ 
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. Part II traces the 
boundaries of students’ Fourth Amendment rights and summarizes a 
recent Supreme Court case that Part III argues should guide where cell 
phones fall within those boundaries.  
 
                                                 
85 Id. at 400. 
86 Id. at 413–16 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
87  See, e.g., Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www. 
pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (“The vast majority of Americans – 95% – 
now own a cellphone of some kind. The share of Americans that own smartphones 
is now 77%, up from just 35% in Pew Research Center’s first survey of 
smartphone ownership conducted in 2011.”). 
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A. New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Establishing a Standard for School 
Searches 
 The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of school 
officials searching students’ belongings in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 88  In 
T.L.O., a high school student claimed her Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated when the school’s vice principal searched her purse.89 A teacher 
had seen the student smoking a cigarette in a school bathroom and reported 
the student to the vice principal.90 The student denied smoking, which 
prompted the vice principal to search the purse, where he found cigarettes 
and rolling papers he believed were for smoking marijuana.91  
 The Court held that the search was constitutional,92 reaffirming 
that the legality of any search depends “on [its] reasonableness under all 
the circumstances.” 93  Testing the reasonableness, the Court balanced 
students’ expectations of privacy in their personal items against school 
officials’ interest in searching these belongings.94 The Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was “unsuited to the school 
environment” because requiring a teacher to get a warrant before searching 
a student’s belongings “would interfere with the maintenance of the swift 
and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”95 In its place, 
the Court established a two-step test for testing the reasonableness of a 
search in the school setting.96 For a search to be reasonable, it must be (1) 
“justified at its inception,”97 and be (2) “reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference.”98 Moreover, the measures 
adopted by the school cannot be “excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”99 As applied, the 
teacher’s eyewitness testimony justified the search at its inception and in 
its scope, since the vice principal reasonably believed the search of her 
purse would produce evidence of school misconduct, and because students 
                                                 
88 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
89 Id. at 328. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 340. 
93 Id. at 341. 
94 Id. at 337. 
95 Id. at 330–31. 
96 Id. at 341. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 342. 
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do not have a strong expectation of privacy as to bookbags and purses 
while at school.100  
B. Safford United School District v. Redding: Defining the Limits 
for School Searches 
In Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the Court held 
that a strip search of a thirteen-year-old student accused of hiding pills on 
her person was invasive enough to tip the balance against the 
reasonableness of the search.101 Administrators suspected that the student 
was distributing prescription drugs to other students, so the they directed 
the school nurse to search her bra and expose her underwear.102 The Court 
applied T.L.O.’s “reasonable suspicion” test to the facts, finding that the 
search was justified at its inception because the principal had heard the 
student was distributing pills to students.103 However, the scope of the 
search—pulling away a young girl’s underwear—was not appropriate 
given the important societal expectations of personal privacy as to this 
layer of clothing.104 The Court ultimately concluded that the “combination 
of . . . deficiencies [were] fatal to finding the search reasonable.”105 
C. Riley v. California: Recognizing the Cell Phone’s Status in the 
Privacy Debate 
 In 2014, the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision in a 
digital privacy case, Riley v. California, holding that police must obtain a 
warrant to search the contents of cell phones confiscated during an 
arrest. 106  Police may only search an arrestee’s person and immediate 
surroundings.107 This search “incident to arrest” exception to the warrant 
requirement exists both to ensure officer safety while a suspect is being 
apprehended and to prevent the suspect from destroying any evidence 
within reach.108 The Supreme Court has held that the warrant requirement 
                                                 
100 Id. at 346. 
101 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009).  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 375–76. 
104 Id. at 369. 
105 Id. at 377. 
106 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
107 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969) (establishing the it is 
reasonable for police officers to search the arrestee’s person and the area within 
the arrestee’s immediate control); See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 235–236 (1973) (permitting search of closed cigarette package found on 
arrestee’s person); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, (1981) (holding police 
may search that are within arrestee’s reach). 
108 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
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may be dispensed with only when the underlying justifications for the 
exception apply to the specific situation.109 
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
digital content on an arrestee’s cell phone falls within the scope of the 
search “incident to arrest” exception.110 David Riley was pulled over by 
police for driving with expired registration tags.111 Because Riley had a 
suspended driver’s license, the police impounded the car and performed a 
standard inventory search. 112 During that search, the police found two 
illegal firearms and subsequently arrested Riley. 113  Riley had his cell 
phone on his person at the time of the arrest, and a detective searched 
through its contents and found videos of Riley making gang signs, along 
with photos of Riley standing in front of a vehicle involved in a recent 
shooting. 114  This evidence prompted additional charges including 
shooting at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semi-automatic firearm, 
and attempted murder. 115  Riley moved to suppress the photographic 
evidence taken from his phone, arguing that the warrantless search of his 
phone violated his Fourth Amendment rights.116  
The Court acknowledged the lack of “precise guidance from the 
founding era” as to whether modern cell phones may be searched without 
a warrant.117 Thus, the Court instead applied the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness balancing test, weighing the government’s interest in the 
search against the privacy interests of arrestees, to determine if the search 
was constitutional.118  
The Court found the governmental interests to be minimal, noting 
that the underlying justifications for the search incident to arrest exception 
are not generally applicable to digital content on a phone.119 The Court 
first found that the content on the phone could not be used to harm the 
officers, and thus it did not pose a safety threat. 120 Second, the Court 
                                                 
109 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 (2009). 
110 134 S.Ct. at 2482 (2014). 
111 Id. at 2480 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 2481. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 2484. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 2485. 
120 Id. at 2486. 
 
15   DIALING IT BACK    [Vol. 17 
                   
 
 
reasoned that, once the officers had possession of the phone, there was no 
risk that the suspect would destroy its digital contents.121  
The Court next considered the privacy interests at stake in a cell 
phone search. 122  Although arrestees have a diminished expectation of 
privacy, the Court found that the unique privacy-related concerns of cell 
phones justified a warrant requirement. 123  “Modern cell phones,” the 
Court noted, “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by 
the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”124 The Court clarified 
that the term “cell phone” is a misnomer, declaring instead that these 
“microcomputers” combine the functions of “cameras, video players, 
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, 
maps, [and] newspapers.”125 Thus, the “sum of an individual’s private life 
can be reconstructed” through the totality of a phone’s detailed contents.126 
The Court further noted the immense storage capacity allows one to find 
data extending back to the phone’s purchase.127 In its analysis, the Court 
addressed the nuances of cloud computing, stating that accessing suspects’ 
remote storage content through their phones “would be like finding a key 
in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed [them] to unlock and 
search a house.”128 Considering all the privacy interests at risk, the balance 
tipped heavily in favor of the suspect’s privacy rights. This extensive 
exploration of cell phone privacy interests in Riley serves to justify its 
application to the school setting in Part III. 
III. RILEY’S APPLICABILITY TO THE SCHOOL SETTING 
The Riley Court’s broad pronouncements about the unique privacy 
concerns raised by cell phones should inform future cases involving 
cellphone searches in the school setting. Much of the Court’s rationale 
applies directly or by analogy to the school setting. Both students and 
arrestees have diminished expectations of privacy, but both parties should 
still retain a substantial privacy interest in their digital cell phone data. 
                                                 
121 Id. In its argument, the government posited that information on a cell phone is 
vulnerable to two types of evidence destruction: remote wiping and data 
encryption. The Court dismissed these concerns, downplaying their prevalence, 
and providing examples of reasonable responses to these concerns. Id. at 2486–
88.  
122 Id. at 2487. 
123 Id. at 2493. 
124 Id. at 2488–89. 
125 Id. at 2489. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2491. 
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Moreover, applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test used in 
Riley would lead to the same result in the school setting. 
 Although students have a diminished expectation of privacy 
compared to the general public,129 Riley suggests that the privacy interests 
at stake can be great enough to tip the balance in favor of those with 
decreased privacy expectations.130 The Court has consistently held that 
school children have a lesser expectation of privacy than that of the general 
population.131 When parents send their children to school, they delegate 
some authority to the school.132 Furthermore, public schools as state actors 
exercise a certain degree of control and supervision as part of their 
custodial duty, curtailing public school students’ constitutional rights in 
the school setting.133 
However, the privacy rights highlighted in Riley were not merely 
“general population” privacy rights that must be pared down to apply to 
the school setting. Like students in the school setting, David Riley also 
experienced a diminished expectation of privacy because of his status as 
an arrestee. The Court has long recognized a decreased expectation of 
privacy of an arrestee’s person. 134  Guiding this recognition was the 
concern for officer safety and evidence preservation, or put more broadly, 
the need for police to exercise reasonable control over the environment, 
                                                 
129 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (“While we do 
not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree 
of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect,’ we 
have acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities ac[t] in loco 
parentis,’ with the power and indeed the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners 
of civility.’”) (citations omitted). 
130 134 S.Ct. at at 2497. 
131 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 656–57; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 348 (1985)). 
132 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 656 (1995) (“Fourth Amendment rights, 
no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public 
schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ 
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”). 
133 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“We have 
nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public 
schools ‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings,’ and must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.’”) (citations omitted). 
134 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“It is well settled 
that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”); id. at 260 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I 
believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no 
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.”). 
 
17   DIALING IT BACK    [Vol. 17 
                   
 
 
similar to the goal of school administrators.135 Despite this need, the Court 
held that the privacy-related concerns were weighty enough to require a 
warrant to search the contents of a cell phone.136 Indeed, even though the 
police could lawfully confiscate Riley’s phone, he retained his privacy in 
the digital contents of the phone separate from the physical object itself.137 
Similarly, while students routinely have their physical phones confiscated 
due to their diminished sense of privacy in school, that in no way 
diminishes the expectation that the contents will remain private. Because 
the privacy concerns that students have in their cell phone data equals that 
of the general population, Riley suggests that students do not lose privacy 
rights in their cell phone data simply because of their status as students. 
  In Riley, the Court acknowledged both the newness and 
pervasiveness of modern cell phones. 138  Without a founding era 
equivalent, the Court could not rely on specific historical guidance, 
although it highlighted the historical concerns of general warrants in the 
colonial era. 139  It instead turned to the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness balancing test to assess the constitutionality of a cell phone 
search, weighing the degree of intrusion against the legitimate 
governmental interests. 140  The lack of founding era guidance on cell 
phones remains the same in all settings, suggesting that the reasonableness 
test should also control cell phone searches in the school setting.141 Indeed, 
schools apply the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness balancing test to 
searches in other contexts, 142 and thus would maintain consistency by 
applying it to cell phones searches. 
School searches must be “reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference.” 143  However, the Riley 
                                                 
135 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484. 
136 Id. at 2495. 
137 Id. at 2485. 
138 See id. at 2484 (“cell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”). 
139 See id. at 2494. “Our cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment was 
the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of 
assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through 
homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity. Opposition to 
such searches was in fact one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself.” 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142  See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
143 Redding, 557 U.S. at 375 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S., at 341). 
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Court rejected the government’s proposal that warrantless cell phone 
searches be permitted, but limited to specific areas of the phone, 144  a 
restriction akin to the requirement that school officials’ searches be 
“reasonable in scope.” Its rationale stemmed from its earlier recognition 
that cell phones store a wide variety of easily accessible personal 
information, leading to a greater potential for the intermingling of 
information and, consequently, an invasion of privacy that exceeds the 
scope of the specific circumstances.145 In doing so, the Court expressed 
doubts that officers could discern exactly where information was located 
without accidentally uncovering other private information. 146  For 
example, in the school context, a principal might have to search through a 
digital photo album to find a specific photo or through an entire text 
message thread to find a specific text. In T.L.O., the Court assumed that 
school officials could search carefully through the contents of physical 
belongings to limit the scope of their intrusion,147 but the complexity of 
cell phones undercuts this assumption. Indeed, some scholars align a 
search of cell phone data closer with that of a strip search such as that in 
Safford, given the potential to uncover sensitive information.148 
Riley’s application to the school setting becomes problematic 
when considering its remedial solution. Riley’s holding dictates that cell 
phone data does not fall within the “incident to arrest” exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 149  While one possible 
procedure in the school setting is to require school administrators to 
request warrants, this solution would be impractical. The Court has stated 
that “the warrant requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment” 
because it would “unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and 
informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”150 Thus, although 
                                                 
144 134 S.Ct.  at 2492. 
145 Id. at 2485. 
146  See id. at 2492. (“This approach would again impose few meaningful 
constraints on officers. The proposed categories would sweep in a great deal of 
information, and officers would not always be able to discern in advance what 
information would be found where.”). 
147 See 469 U.S. at 343 (“By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, 
the standard will . . . permit [teachers and school administrators] to regulate their 
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.”). 
148  See Bernard James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart 
Devices After Riley v. California, 101 IOWA L. REV. 343, 354 (2015) (“One must 
logically conclude that the higher-order privacy interest of students to resist a strip 
search is equal to (if not greater than) the higher expectation of privacy students 
now possess in the digital contents of their cell phones.”). 
149 Riley, 134 S.Ct.at 2495 (2014). 
150 T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 340. 
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the heightened privacy concerns and the diminished privacy expectations 
are similar between arrestees and students, the unique discipline 
mechanisms in the school environment require a different procedure than 
the warrant standard in Riley.151  
IV. HOW CELL PHONES UNDERMINE THE POST-TINKER  
OFF-CAMPUS DOCTRINE 
Both cell phones and the developing body of law surrounding their 
regulation in the school setting have the potential to disrupt the off-campus 
speech tests discussed in Part I. The argument in favor of recognizing 
students’ higher privacy expectations in their digital cell phone data 
extends beyond Fourth Amendment concerns. The conversations had, and 
the photos taken on cell phones constitute protected expression against 
government interference. Because students’ phones contain expressive 
contents that would fall under the First Amendment’s protection in a non-
school situation, the T.L.O. reasonableness balance should tip to support a 
higher privacy expectation. This conclusion, however, depends in part on 
whether such digital contents are afforded First Amendment protection 
from school officials. That question depends upon the various circuit court 
tests for off-campus school speech regulation. Although these tests were 
developed within the past decade, the ubiquity of cell phone use among 
students is even more recent and threatens to undermine the assumptions 
on which these tests were based.152 As Part I discussed, these tests fall into 
two general categories: (1) “proximity thresholds” and (2) “safety 
thresholds.”  
Proximity thresholds have quickly become obsolete in an age 
where all digital speech can be accessed at any time, including while at 
school. 153  Continuing to uphold “reasonable foreseeability” tests will 
ultimately extend a school’s scope of authority to regulate speech to all 
aspects of a student’s life. If school officials were looking for a source of 
                                                 
151 See infra Part V, proposing one such procedure. 
152 See, e.g., Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-
social-media-technology-2015/ (“Some 88% of teens have or have access to cell 
phones or smartphones and 90% of those teens with phones exchange texts. A 
typical teen sends and receives 30 texts per day.”). 
153 Donna St. George, Schools and cellphones: In elementary schools? At lunch?, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
education/schools-and-cellphones-in-elementary-schools-atlunch/2017/11/13/ 
1061064a-ba81-11e7-a908a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.3569880f6ae5 
(“Students are supposed to use the district’s network while in school, and social 
media sites in Montgomery are blocked for -middle-schoolers, although some 
break the rules and go off the network to access them. High school students can 
use Facebook and Twitter through the network.”). 
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“reasonableness” to search a student’s cell phone, the “reasonable 
foreseeability” test provides near carte blanche justification for these 
searches of any student who communicates through a cell phone.  
Unless a strict application of Riley were to apply to the school 
setting, proximity tests would allow school officials to intrude upon 
students’ privacy interests to regulate any form of digital expression 
accessible by phone, regardless of where or when it was expressed, so long 
as it had any potential to interfere within the school environment. While 
minimizing interference is an important policy goal, this overbroad power 
has the potential to invite even more interference than it would deter. 
Although cell phones contain multitudes of private information and 
expression, students do not consciously bring every private 
communication or expression to the school community when they bring 
the physical phone on campus. This broad application would inevitably 
chill protected speech and extend the supervisory role of the state far 
beyond the limits of the schoolhouse gate, infringing on students’ First 
Amendment rights. 
The safety thresholds used by the Fifth and Ninth circuits create a 
heightened standard for defining a school’s scope of authority over off-
campus student speech. However, the standards in their current form are 
too vague. The “identifiable threat” test developed in Wynar permits a 
more limited yet vague set of circumstances in which school officials may 
regulate student speech. Although the Ninth Circuit considered the danger 
of school shootings and the school’s duty to maintain a safe environment 
when limiting Tinker to on-campus speech,154 it did not elaborate on the 
threats or violence covered. The test is thus ambiguous as to the scope of 
the school’s reach. Serious and immediate threats of physical harm such 
as those in Wynar seem to fall within this scope, but less overt forms of 
violence such as cyberbullying remain unclear. Arguably, if a victim 
presented evidence of one-on-one cyberbullying from his or her own 
phone, there would be no need to search the other’s phone. However, 
because cyberbullying can take many forms, 155  consensual third-party 
disclosure may not be possible in all cases. 156 The Fifth Circuit’s test 
                                                 
154 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2013). 
155  See What is Cyberbullying?, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2018); What is cyberbullying exactly? STOP CYBERBULLYING, 
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html  
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
156 See Corinne David-Ferdon & Marci Feldman Hertz, Electronic Media and 
Youth Violence: A CDC Issue Brief for Researchers, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL at 6 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/electronic 
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suffers from the same vagueness concerns, failing to define the 
“threatening,” “harassing,” or “intimidating” language that is required 
before applying Tinker.157  
This presents a separate procedural issue that the court 
acknowledged, but failed to rule on definitively.158 With safety thresholds, 
the initial hurdles are arguably more heightened than Tinker itself. Indeed, 
speech that could pose an identifiable threat to the safety of students would 
also foreseeably reach the school community and would also substantially 
disrupt or materially interfere with the school environment. Thus, if the 
initial threshold is met, the Tinker threshold is also met. This suggests, as 
Part V argues, that Tinker may not be the most suitable avenue for 
regulating serious threats made off-campus. 
V. A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION 
A. Abolish Threshold Tests and Create a Third, Limited 
Categorical Exception to Protected Student Speech 
 The threshold tests developed by the various circuit courts suffer 
from inconsistency, vagueness, and, for some, irrelevance in the modern 
age. Schools should expect that nearly all student speech will foreseeably 
reach the school setting. Thus, schools cannot rely on a geographical nexus 
without eradicating Tinker and extending school regulation to all facets of 
a student’s social life. 
 Instead, courts should abandon the outdated threshold tests and 
establish a third, narrow categorical exception to Tinker—granting schools 
the authority to regulate speech that poses a credible and substantial threat 
of physical danger, regardless of its origin. This includes when the speech 
severely impedes the ability of another student to enjoy a benefit or 
opportunity provided by the school and when the speech jeopardizes the 
safety of a member of the school community. This category would allow 
schools to regulate threats of violence directed at the school, but would 
recognize the limited supervisory role that school officials should play in 
a child’s life. Thus, this higher standard would allow for certain forms of 
disfavored off-campus speech—such as mockery, criticism, and certain 
                                                 
_aggression_researcher_brief-a.pdf (“[B]etween 13% and 46% of young people 
who were victims of electronic aggression reported not knowing their harasser’s 
identity. Likewise, 22% of perpetrators of electronic aggression reported not 
knowing the identity of their victim.”). 
157 See Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 416 (5th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
158 See id. at 397 (“Arguably, a student’s threatening, harassing, and intimidating 
a teacher inherently portends a substantial disruption, making feasible a per se 
rule in that regard.”). 
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unpopular types of creative expression—to fall clearly outside the scope 
of school authorities. By limiting the school’s scope of authority to serious 
threats posed to the school, this threshold protects students’ First 
Amendment rights online and outside of school while still allowing 
schools to maintain a safe environment. 
 This proposed categorical exception to protected speech is not a 
radical departure from the Court’s prior decisions; the Court has twice 
established categorical content-based exceptions to protected student 
speech. In Fraser, the Court held that schools may regulate lewd and 
vulgar speech on school grounds without considering the Tinker test to 
prevent “undermin[ing] the school’s basic educational mission.” 159  In 
Morse, the Court held that schools may regulate speech aimed at 
promoting illegal drug use “to safeguard those entrusted to their care.”160 
These categorical exceptions were limited to the school environment, but 
the Court in Morse did acknowledge that the school’s environment is not 
bound by a geographical limitation.161 These exceptions were grounded in 
the need for school officials to act swiftly in the face of a “special danger” 
to the unique characteristics of the school environment. 162  Substantial 
threats against the safety of students or teachers, whether made in the 
hallway or sent from a student’s phone, present a special danger to the 
school community. 
 By creating a limited categorical exception to protected student 
speech, the Court can do away with over-inclusive threshold tests that 
allow schools to regulate virtually all digital student speech. The Court 
would need to define the contours of such an exception and establish some 
reasonable objectivity requirement when considering if the speech 
constitutes a substantial threat. The lower court cases have provided 
examples of speech that could fall within this exception. In Wynar, the 
student continually posted violent messages on social media, threatening 
to shoot students his school on the anniversary of the Columbine shooting, 
describing the gun he would use and contemplating who his victims would 
be.163 This speech presented a credible and substantial threat to the school 
community. Regardless of the reasonable foreseeability of it reaching the 
campus, the school was presented with a special danger it should be able 
to address.164  
                                                 
159 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
160 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
161 Id. at 400–01. 
162 Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). 
163 Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2013). 
164 Id. 
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B. Establish a Two-Prong Procedure for Cell Phone Searches that 
Arise under the “Substantial Threat” Exception 
When presented with evidence of a credible threat, school 
administrators should be able to take reasonable measures to uncover the 
details of the threat and prevent any danger from occurring. This 
exemplifies the first prong in T.L.O.’s reasonableness test—“justification 
at inception.” 165  In many cases, threats are communicated digitally, 
whether they are posted in a public forum like Facebook or communicated 
privately through a one-on-one message.166 Publicly posted threats do not 
present the same privacy issues as private communications.167 Often, the 
speech at issue can be brought to the attention of administrators willingly 
by concerned students with access to the threatening speech. Private or 
semi-private communications present a more difficult situation for 
administrators. If, for example, a student shows his classmates photos of 
his plan to carry out a school shooting or a document which describes how 
to create an explosive device, the direct evidence of a threat never leaves 
his phone.  
 Because of the heightened privacy interests at stake, school 
administrators who reasonably believe there is direct evidence of 
substantially threatening speech on a student’s cell phone still must afford 
the student some due process before searching the phone. Even if Riley’s 
warrant requirement does not apply to the school setting, the Court’s 
acknowledgement of the privacy risks at stake should require the school 
to develop a standard procedure before searching a student’s phone.168 
Specific elements of that standard procedure are recommended below. 
1. Obtain Parental Consent 
In many cases, the student’s parent is the actual owner of the 
phone, and thus could give a school administrator permission to search the 
phone if the administrator suspects that the desired information would 
                                                 
165 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).  
166 See St. George, supra note 153. 
167  Social media users have no justifiable expectation that users within their 
network will keep posted information private. A larger social media network, 
increases the chances that information will be viewed by someone the user never 
expected to view it. See Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, 2012 WL 6720752 (E.D. 
N.Y. 2012). 
168 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (“Modern cell phones are 
not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may 
reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”). 
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cause a substantial threat to the school environment.169 The school could 
also allow the parent to be present during the search or to conduct the 
search on behalf of the school. 
 While a parental consent requirement might easily mitigate this 
issue, there are several potential problems with this approach. First, 
sometimes phones belong to the students themselves. Minors usually 
cannot sign up for a cell phone plan, but there is no age restriction on 
buying a phone. Moreover, some students aren’t minors, and thus could 
both own the phone and contract with the wireless network. Second, not 
every parent will give consent for a school official to search their child’s 
phone. Although parents and educators ideally work in partnership to 
support the child, some parents are more hostile toward school officials or 
simply may not want to assist in a disciplinary action. Third, this procedure 
assumes that parents are available to come to the school to observe a search 
or at least receive a call during the day. This is not the case with many 
working parents. If a school administrator could not reach a parent, 
presumably the school would retain possession of the phone beyond the 
end of the school day, thus depriving the child of a necessary instrument. 
Finally, while the parent may own the phone, that technicality does not 
diminish the child’s privacy interest in the phone’s contents. The Riley 
Court framed cell phone privacy in terms of the vast amount of personal 
data and the potential to invade that sense of privacy.170 Children rely on 
a certain degree of privacy regarding their phones, and such a system could 
betray their reliance on that understanding of privacy. 
2. Documented Internal Review 
 Despite its flaws, a procedure requiring parental consent allows 
for the school to work in tandem with the parents to prevent substantial 
threats at school while also providing a check on the school administrator. 
Ideally, such a procedure would still be strictly limited in scope to prevent 
unnecessary invasions of students’ private data. Administrators who could 
not get parental consent could still afford the student due process by 
documenting the scope and purpose of the search on a standard form akin 
to an administrative warrant.171 
                                                 
169 See Amanda Lenhart et al., Chapter Four: How Parents and Schools Regulate 
Teens’ Mobile Phones, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2010), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/04/20/chapter-four-how-parents-and-schools-
regulate-teens-mobile-phones. 
170 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2489. 
171 Administrative warrants require a lower standard than criminal warrants and 
are “measured against a flexible standard of reasonableness.” See v. City of 
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). 
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 Under this scheme, the school employee seeking information from 
a student’s phone would fill out a standard form, detailing the facts and 
circumstances justifying the request. The employee would name the 
specific apps or folders which he believes might contain the threatening 
speech and provide the source of his suspicion. 
 Before the search, an independent administrator, likely the 
principal, should review the document and use his discretion to decide if 
the threat is credible and warrants suspicion. After signing off on the 
document, the independent administrator would conduct the limited search 
in the presence of the reporting employee, the student, and a student 
representative. This process assumes that a student would comply, albeit 
reluctantly. If the student obstructed this process, such as by refusing to 
provide the password to his phone, then further disciplinary procedures 
would become necessary. 
 These solutions present practical policies for raising higher Fourth 
Amendment safeguards and protecting students’ right to privacy in their 
cell phone data. School boards and state legislatures can incorporate 
concerns and ideas voiced by their constituents and craft policies that 
recognize students’ rights and school administrators’ interests in 
maintaining a safe environment.  
CONCLUSION  
 Without relevant guidance from the courts, school administrators 
will be left to navigate a patchwork of vague thresholds to avoid depriving 
students of their constitutional rights while maintaining a safe and secure 
school community. The unique privacy interests students have in their cell 
phones present further problems for schools.  
As the splits among the courts of appeals increase, so too will the 
pressure on the Supreme Court to resolve the problem of students’ First 
Amendment speech rights in the age of cell phones. Until then, the nuances 
of these threshold tests will continue to plague students and administrators 
alike in the wake of emerging communication technologies. Abolishing 
these tests and replacing them with a heightened categorical exception to 
the Tinker standard would adhere to the logic of the Supreme Court’s prior 
decisions. It would also provide adequate and reasonable notice of the 
scope of a school administrator’s authority to regulate students’ off-
campus speech and of students’ privacy concerning such speech. Finally, 
it would provide the justification required to conduct reasonable searches 
in the school setting.   
 
 
